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ON THE RIVER OF ARTIFICIAL AND ARBITRARY IMPAIRMENT:
AN ERRONEOUS ANALYSIS
ERIC W. LAM*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A Chapter 11 bankruptcy case culminates in a plan that proposes to
restructure the debtor's assets and liabilities. Ideally, the Chapter 11
bankruptcy plan is conceived by negotiation and consensus among
classes of creditors, debtors, and equity holders.' Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code2 does not, however, require unanimous acceptance by
all creditor classes for a plan to achieve confirmation. For example, a
class of claims is deemed to have accepted the plan if, within the class,
more than one half of voting creditors holding at least two-thirds of the
3
dollar amounts of the claims in that class vote to accept the plan.
Similarly, if the plan contains one or more impaired classes of noninsider claims, an affirmative vote by only one impaired non-insider
class can (assuming other confirmation requirements have been met) 4
produce confirmation.
On October 8, 1993, a panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
redefined the impairment concept. The Eighth Circuit panel opinion in

* Member, Moyer & Bergman P.L.C., Attorneys at Law, Cedar Rapids, Iowa. B.A. (cum laude)
Macalester College 1979; J.D. (with distinction) University of Iowa College of Law 1982. The author
thanks Stanley M. Herkelman, Thomas G. McCuskey, Mary Louise Taylor, and Brenda K. Werner for
their comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. See. e.g., Meltzer. Disenfranchisingthe Dissenting CreditorThrough Artificial Classification or
Artificial Inpairment,66 AM. B ANKR. LJ. 281, 312 (1992) (stating that "chapter 11 is intended to foster
plans of reorganization which are consensual to the greatest possible extent").
2. The term 'Bankruptcy Code" or 'Code' refers to Title 11 of the United States Code, as enacted
by P.L. 95-598. 92 Stat. 2631 (1978), and subsequent amendments through and including September 1.
1994. The term "Bankruptcy Act" or "Act" refers to the Bankruptcy Act of July 1. 1898, ch. 541, 30
Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). Cases decided under the Bankruptcy Act continue to be influential in
interpreting Bankruptcy Code provisions. This is so because
[w]hen Congress amends the bankruptcy laws, it does not write 'on a clean slate.' [The
Supreme] Court has been reluctant to accept arguments that would interpret the Code.
however vague the particular language under consideration might be, to effect a major
change in pre-Code practice that is not the subject of at least some discussion in the
legislative history.
Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 779(1992).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1988).
"[Tihe principal purpose of any Chapter 11 case is the formulation of a plan of
reorganization ....
Within every plan is a description of how each class of creditors
and equity security holders are to be treated with regard to their claims or interests. The
plan must classify each claim and interest as well as state whether the class will be
impaired or unimpaired. If any class of claims is impaired, the plan must further set forth
the way in which each impaired class will be treated."
K. Mallory & R. Phelan, To Impair or Not to Impair - That Is the Question in Chapter 11
Reorganization, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 869,871 (1986).
4. E.g.. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1) - (a)(9), (a)(l 1) - (a)(13) (1988).
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In re Windsor on the River Associates, Ltd.5 held that "for purposes of 11
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10), a claim is not impaired if the alteration of rights in
question arises solely from the debtor's exercise of discretion." 6 Windsor
involved a real estate partnership that owned an apartment complex in
Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Other than the apartment complex, the debtor had
no asset. The Chapter 11 petition was filed to toll foreclosure endeavors
exerted by the secured creditor. The trial court confirmed the debtor's
plan of reorganization. The Eighth Circuit panel reversed, held
confirmation could not be achieved, and dismissed the case.
This article begins with a brief study of the development of the
"impairment" concept. 7 The article then examines the Windsor facts and
holding 8 , and illustrates that application of the Windsor rule will lead to
unrealistic and unworkable results. 9 The article concludes that the
Windsor analysis is flawed and should not be followed by other courts. 10
II.

IMPAIRMENT AND CONFIRMATION

In a typical Chapter 11 proceeding, the debtor proposes a plan of
reorganization. The plan may contain many features, ranging from a
complete liquidation of the debtor's business to a total restructuring of
the debtor's obligations and business operations." During the first 120
days after the filing of a voluntary Chapter 11 petition, the debtor enjoys
the exclusive right to file a plan. 12 Such temporal plan-filing exclusivity
may be reduced "for cause," and similarly may be extended "for
cause." 13 After this exclusivity period has expired, any "party in interest"
may file a plan.14

5. 7 F.3d 127 (8th Cir. 1993).
6. In re Windsor on the River Assocs.. Ltd.. 7 F.3d 127. 132 (8th Cir. 1993).
7. See infra notes 11-28 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 29-50 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 51-66 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 67-83 and accompanying text.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (1988). For example, the plan may
provide for.., the settlement or adjustment of any claim or interest belonging to the
debtor or to the estate; or the retention and enforcement by the debtor ... of any such
claim or interest; [or]
provide for the sale of all or substantially all of the property of the
estate . . . ;and include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the
applicable provisions of [the Bankruptcy Code.]
II U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3) -(5) (1988).
12. Id. § 1121(b).
13. Id. § 1121(d). See generally Lam, Of Exclusivity and for Cause: 11 U.S.C. Section 1121(d)
Re-Examined, 36 DRAKE L REV. 533 (1987). "Cause" includes size and complexity of the case and
nature of the debtor's business. Id. at 541-45.
14. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (1988). The debtor, a creditor, a creditors' committee, and an indenture
trustee are "parties in interest." See 11 U.S.C. § 1109 (1988).
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Plan confirmation requirements are enunciated in section 1129 of
the Bankruptcy Code. Germane to this discussion is section 1129(a)
(10), which provides that:
The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following
requirements are met:
If a class of claims is impaired under the plan, at least one class
of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan,
determined without including any acceptance of the plan by
any insider.15
In other words, assuming all other plan confirmation requirements
are met, if the plan contains one class of impaired non-insider claims,
then the plan may be confirmed only if that impaired class of noninsider claims accepts the plan. If the plan contains two impaired classes
of non-insider claims, then the plan may be confirmed only if at least
one of the two impaired classes accepts the plan.1 6 Similarly, if the plan
contains ten impaired classes of non-insider claims, then the plan may be
confirmed only if at least one of those ten impaired classes of claims
accepts the plan. The other nine impaired classes of claims will receive
treatment pursuant to the terms of the confirmed plan, despite rejection
17
of the plan by any of these nine impaired classes of claims.
Impairment is defined in section 1124. In pertinent parts, section
1124 states:
[A] class of claims . . . is impaired under a plan unless, with
respect to each claim... of such class, the plan (1) leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual rights
to which such claim. . . entitles the holder of such claim .. ;
(2) notwithstanding any contractual provision or applicable law
that entitles the holder of such claim ... to demand or receive
accelerated payment of such claim ... after the occurrence of
a default ... cures any such default ....

15.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (1988). For a general discussion of other plan confirmation
requirements, see J. Pearson et al, DRAFrING BANKRUPrCY REORGANIZAION PLANS (Wiley & Sons 1992
and Supp.).
16. In re Block Shim Development Co.. 939 F.2d 289, 291 (5th Cir. 1991).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1988). The power to impose confirmation against creditor rejection is
referred to as 'cram down." See generally K. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down
Under the New Bankruptcy Code. 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133 (1978).
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(3) provides that, on the effective date of the plan, the holder of
such claim . . . receives, on account of such claim . . . cash
18
equal to... the allowed amount of such claim[.]
The legislative history accompanying section 1124 reveals
congressional intent in three respects: departure from the old Bankruptcy Act approach; indicia of creditor support; and enhancement of
creditor participation.
A.

DEPARTURE FROM BANKRUPTCY ACT APPROACH

Section 107 of the old Bankruptcy Act stated that creditors "shall be
deemed to be 'affected' by a plan only if their . . . interests shall be
materially and adversely affected thereby."1 9 Congress did not
enunciate what specific methods of treatment would produce "material
and adverse" effect. As a result, the concept of "material and adverse"
effect was developed by caselaw interpretation. Such case-by-case
interpretation, however, generated "inherent ambiguities. "20 To resolve
these ambiguities, Congress enacted new Code section 1124 "to indicate
when contractual rights of creditors . . . are not materially affected." 2 1
Specifically, the three methods of treatment described in section 1124
are the only "ways in which [a] plan may leave a claim or interest
unimpaired." 22 In essence, new Code section 1124 provides three
exclusive statutory methods of unimpaired treatment. The section 1-124
statutory definition approach therefore represents a departure from the
23
case-by-case approach under the old Bankruptcy Act.
B.

INDICIA OF CREDITOR SUPPORT

A second purpose of enacting section 1124 was to generate indicia
of creditor support. Specifically, in enacting Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, Congress was cognizant that
[m]ost business arrangements, that is, extensions or compositions (reduction) of debts, occur out-of-court. The outof-court

18. I1U.S.C.§ 1124(1988).
19. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 708 (1976) (Bankruptcy Act §§ 107, 108; repealed 1978) (emphasis
added).
20. Fortgang & King, The 1978 Bankruptcy Code: Some Wrong Decisions, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1148, 1154 (1981).
21. H. R. REP. No. 95-595. 95th Cong., Ist Sess., at 408 (1977)
22. Id.
23. See 124 CONG REc. HI 113 (Sept. 28, 1978).
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procedure, sometimes known as a common law composition, is
quick and inexpensive. However, it requires near universal
agreement of the business's creditors, and is limited in the relief
it can provide for an over-extended business. When an
out-of-court arrangement is inadequate to rehabilitate a
business, the bankruptcy laws provide an alternative. An
arrangement or reorganization accomplished under the
Bankruptcy Act binds nonconsenting creditors, and permits
more substantial restructuring of a debtor's finances than does
an out-of-court work-out. 2 4
While recognizing the problem associated with the "near universal
agreement" of out-of-court workouts, Congress also was cautious not to
grant plan proponents the unfettered ability to confirm plans over
unanimous rejection. 2 5 The "one impaired class acceptance" requirement of section 1129(a)(10) is therefore designed to grant confirmation
only to those plans that "provide some indicia of support by affected
creditors. "26
C.

CREDITOR PARTICIPATION

Under the old Bankruptcy Act, unless the creditor's rights were
"affected," the creditor's vote did not count toward satisfying a confirmation requirement. 27 To disenfranchise creditors from participating in the
plan, process, plan proponents would simply propose plans that did not
"affect" the disenfranchised creditors. To provide creditors, "affected"
and "unaffected," a larger voice in the plan confirmation process, section
1124 permits creditors to vote on plans when there exists the "slightest
impairment." 2 8 Only when the section 1124(1)-(3) unimpairment
provisions are met would a creditor's voice be denied reception. The net

24. H. R. REP. No. 95-595. 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 220(1978).
25. In re Polytherm Industries. Inc., 33 B.R. 823, 835 (W.D. Wis. 1983) (finding "nothing in the
Bankruptcy Reform Act to indicate that Congress intended that the bankruptcy courts could saddle
creditors with a stake in a reorganized corporation under a plan that had received no acceptances
from impaired classes of creditors[.J').
26. In re Lettick Typografic, Inc., 103 B.R. 32, 38 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989).
27. See 11 U.S.C. § 579 (1976) (Bankruptcy Act § 179; repealed 1978) ('After a plan has been
accepted... by... creditors.. .. exclusive of creditors... who are not affected by the plan ... the
judge shall fix a hearing ... for the consideration of the confirmation of the plan."); see also In re
Barrington Oaks General Partnership, 15 B.R. 952, 963 n.26 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) ('under the Act. if
a claim was not materially and adversely affected, it did not count'); 6 J. MOORE & L. KINO. COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY S 7.41. at 1343 (14th ed. 1978); I1 U.S.C. § 579 (1976) (Bankruptcy Act §179;
repealed 1978).
28. In re Wilhelm, 101 B.R. 120, 122 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989)., Indeed, the unimpairment
provisions of sections 1124(1), (2), and (3) are "three narrow exceptions" to voting entitlement. Id.
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effect is that more creditors may participate, via plan voting, in the plan
confirmation process.
Bearing in mind these congressional objectives, the Windsor facts
and holding will now be examined.
III. IN RE WINDSOR ON THE RIVER
Windsor on the River Associates, Ltd. ("Windsor") owned an
apartment complex in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. 2 9 The apartment complex
was "essentially the only asset" of Windsor. 3 0 Windsor owed approximately $10 million to Balcor Real Estate Finance ("Balcor"). 3 1 The $10
million Balcor claim was secured by a mortgage on the apartment
complex. The note to Balcor was scheduled to balloon in May 1991.32
Between March 1991 and May 1991, Windsor "tried unsuccessfully to
negotiate a loan extension with Balcor. . . . "33 Five days before the
maturity date of the note, Windsor filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition
in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
34

Iowa.

Windsor filed a reorganization plan, consisting of six creditor
classes of claims. 3 5 Germane to this analysis are Class I, consisting of
Balcor's claim, 36 and Class III, consisting of the claims of several
unsecured trade creditors. 37 The total amount of the unsecured trade
debts in Class III was $13,000.38 The total amount of Balcor's claim in

Class I was $10 million. However, Balcor was scheduled to receive only
$500,000 on the plan's effective date. 39 Part of this $500,000 would be
derived from a new $1 million capital contribution from the limited

29. In re Windsor on the River Assoc., Ltd., 7 F.3d 127. 129 (8th Cir. 1993).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. In re Windsor, 7 F.3d at 129.
35. Id. The claim held by Class II was disallowed, and was therefore not germane to the plan
confirmation process. Id. Class IV contained the claims of tenants for return of their tenant security
deposits. Id. The plan provided for payment of those deposits in accordance with the leases. Id.
Class IV was therefore not impaired, because its treatment "leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and
contractual rights to which such claim ...
entitles the holder of such claim," within the meaning of
section 1124(1) of the United States Code. Id. Classes V and VI contained interests held by the
general and limited partners, i.e. insiders. Id. Since section 1129(a)(10) of the United States Code
provides that the 'one impaired class acceptance" requirement applies only to non-insider classes,
Classes V and VI were also not germane to the Windsor analysis.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. In re Windsor,7 F.3d at 129.
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partners. 4 0 Further, the plan proposed to extend the Balcor note
maturity date ten years, and called for Windsor to make monthly
41
payments to Balcor on a thirty-year amortization schedule.
The unsecured trade debts in Class III were scheduled to be paid in
full sixty days after the plan's effective date. 4 2 Because the Class III
unsecured trade creditors would not receive cash on the effective date of
the plan, Windsor argued that the treatment of this class did not meet the
definition of "unimpaired" under section 1124(3). Windsor therefore
43
contended the Class III claims were impaired.
Class III voted to accept the plan. 44 Balcor, the Class I creditor,
voted to reject the plan. 4 5 Because Class III (which, according to
Windsor, was an impaired class) voted to accept the plan, Windsor
theorized that the "one impaired class acceptance" requirement of section
1129(a)(10) had been met. 46 Windsor therefore sought confirmation of
its plan. The trial court confirmed Windsor's plan, and Balcor ap7
pealed. 4
On appeal, an Eighth Circuit panel held that "for purposes of
section 1129(a)(10) of Title 11 of the United States Code, a claim is not
impaired if the alteration of rights in question arises solely from the
debtor's exercise of discretion." 48 The panel reasoned:
[t]he face of Debtor's . . . plan . . . clearly shows that the
unsecured trade creditors' claims of Class [III] . . . were
arbitrarily and artificially impaired. Simple remanipulation of
the plan demonstrates this. Had Debtor's plan allowed for a
smaller payment to Balcor, say, $400,000 instead of $500,000,
Debtor could have paid ... the Class ... [III] claimants on the
effective date. Balcor would have been the only impaired
claimant. As the only impaired claimant, and as a secured
claimant, it is likely that Balcor would have rejected Debtor's
plan. ... Oddly, Balcor was placed in the position of possibly

40. Id.
41. Id. at 130.
42. Id. at 129.
43. See id. at 130.
44. See In re Windsor, 7 F.3d at 130.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. Judge Melloy served as United States Bankruptcy Judge from 1986 through 1992. In 1992,
he was appointed to serve on the United States District Court. I ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY,
8TH CIRCUIT-13 (1994). The Windsor bankruptcy case was filed while he was the Bankruptcy Judge.
Upon appointment to the District Court, Judge Melloy retained the Windsor case. and held the
confirmation hearing in his capacity as District Judge.
48. In re Windsor,7 F.3d at 132.
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having to argue that it should receive less under the plan in the
hope that its interests might be protected. The only purpose to
be served by the delay in payment to the Class . . . [III]
payments was, therefore, to ensure approval by at least one
"impaired" class as required by Section 1129(a)(1). Debtor
49
never presented a plausible alternative explanation.
The panel then concluded "[i]t is therefore unlikely that Balcor
would accept any plan Debtor might propose. Since it is apparent that
there is no plan Debtor would propose which the only impaired creditor
. . . would approve, remand for further proceedings would be futile.
Accordingly, the cause is reversed and dismissed." 50
IV. WINDSOR'S FAUX PAS
Windsor's analysis is erroneous. Its illogic can be illustrated by
three hypothetical examples:

A.

HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE

No. 1

Assume Windsor can raise $10 million. In its plan, Windsor must
deal with at least 5 ' two classes of claims: the unsecured trade creditor
claims of $13,000 and Balcor's secured claim of $10 million. Since
Windsor can only raise $10 million, it does not currently have $
10,013,000 to pay both classes of claims. Bearing in mind that
confirmation may be achieved only if one impaired class accepts the
plan, Windsor proposes the following: pay Balcor $9,987,000 cash on
the plan's effective date; one month after the plan's effective date, pay
Balcor the remaining $13,000 with one month's interest; 52 and on the
plan's effective date pay $13,000 to the unsecured creditors. Since
Balcor would not receive its total $10 million secured claim on the
effective date but rather $9,987,000 on the effective date and $13,000
one month later, Balcor's claim is impaired. 53 Even though desiring total
payment of its $10 million secured claim on the effective date, Balcor

49. Id. at 132-33.
50. Id. at 133.
51. See supra note 35 (discussing briefly the other four classes of claims that are either not
impaired or disallowed or composed of insider claims (whose votes do not count toward the "one
impaired class acceptance" requirement), and are therefore not germane to our analysis).
52. The $13,000 with interest may, for example. be derived from operating revenues generated
during the one month after the effective date.
53. See I I U.S.C. § 1124(3) (1988) (providing that a class of claims is impaired unless "on the
effective date of the plan, the holder of such claim receives... cash equal to ... the allowed amount
of such claim').
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nonetheless votes to accept the plan treatment. Balcor so voted because a
wait of merely thirty days to receive its total $10 million is, in Balcor's
judgment, not unreasonable.
Under the Eighth Circuit analysis, the impairment of Balcor's claim
54
obviously "arise[s] solely from the debtor's exercise of discretion."
This is so because, instead of paying $9,987,000 to Balcor and $13,000
to the unsecured creditors on the plan's effective date, Windsor could
have paid the entire $10 million to Balcor on the effective date.
Windsor's plan would not be confirmable, 5 5 because Balcor, in the Eighth
Circuit's view, is not truly impaired given "the alteration of rights ...
56
aris[ing] solely from the debtor's exercise of discretion."

B.

HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE

No. 2

Assume Windsor cannot raise any new capital. Instead, Windsor
demonstrates to the satisfaction of the bankruptcy court that projected
cash flow will support repayment in full of Balcor's $10 million secured
debt over a ten-year period and the unsecured trade creditors' $13,000
debt over a two-year period. The cash flow further projects that during
the first month of post-confirmation operation, a surplus of $13,000
after routine operating expenses would be available. Windsor proposes
to use the surplus $13,000 for extraordinary but necessary repairs and
upgrades of the apartment units and building premises. For whatever
reason-economic or otherwise-Balcor rejects the plan. The unsecured
creditors, however, accept the plan. Since the unsecured creditors would
not receive "on the effective date of the plan ... cash equal to ... the
allowed amount of such claim," the unsecured creditor class is impaired
within the meaning of section 1124(3).57 Similarly, the unsecured class
is impaired within the meaning of section 1124(1) because the plan does
not "leave[] unaltered the legal . . . rights to which [the unsecured] claim
[is] . . . entitle[d]."58 Section 1124(2) is likewise not met, since a
two-year payout does not "reinstate[] 'the maturity of such claim[.J" 5 9

54. In re Windsor, 7 F.3d at 132.
55. The plan is not confirmable even if no creditor objects. This is so because title 11, section
1129(a) of the United States Code permits confirmation "only if all" of the requirements of section
1129(a) are met. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a) (1988). Given the bankruptcy court's duty to independently
scrutinize the plan for confirmation infirmities, see, e.g., In re Moore, 81 B.R. 513. 517 (Bankr. S.D.
Iowa 1988); In re Holthoff, 58 B.R. 216. 218 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1985), under the Eighth Circuit
Windsor rule, the bankruptcy court must find that Balcor's "impairment" fails to meet section
1129(a)(10) of the United States Code. In re Windsor. 7 F.3d at 131.
56. In re Windsor,7 F.3d at 132.
57. 11 U.S.C. § 1124(3) (1988).
58. 11 U.S.C.§ 1124(1) (1988).
59. 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2) (1988).
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Windsor therefore contends that the "one impaired class acceptance" rule
of section 1129(a)(10) is satisfied.
Applying the Windsor analysis, the two-year unsecured repayment
period would have "arise[n] solely from the debtor's exercise of
discretion." 60 Instead of spending $13,000 on repairs and upgrades
during the first plan month, Windsor could have paid the $13,000 to the
unsecured creditors. Acceptance by the unsecured creditors would
therefore not satisfy the "one impaired class acceptance" requirement of
section 1129(a)(10).
C.

HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE No. 3

Windsor convinces its limited partners to inject $13,000. The
$13,000 injection could, in Windsor's discretion, be directed to at least
three expenditures: apply towards Balcor debt; repay the unsecured
claims; or pay for repairs and upgrades to the apartment. For whatever
reason-economic, evil, or otherwise-Windsor chooses to spend the
$13,000 for repairs and upgrades. Windsor then proposes to pay Balcor
over ten years and the unsecured creditors over five years. Balcor rejects
the plan, and the unsecured creditors accept the plan.
Under the Windsor analysis, the acceptance by the unsecured
creditors would not meet the "one impaired class acceptance" requirement of section 1129(a)(10). The alteration of the unsecured creditors'
right by paying them over five years, instead of using the $13,000 to pay
them immediately, would have arisen "solely from the debtor's exercise
of discretion."61 The debtor could have, and under the Windsor opinion
should have, paid the $13,000 to the unsecured creditors.
The three hypothetical examples, and other variants the limits of
which are bound only by imagination, illustrate that the Windsor analysis
is unrealistic and unworkable. For example, while a negotiated,
consensual plan treatment is the ideal, 62 a consensual plan is not always
attainable. Indeed, unless the plan confirmation vote is effectuated "not
in good faith,"63 the vote is valid even if the vote is based on the voter's
self interest. 64 In formulating a non-consensual plan, the plan proponent
must necessarily consider how a class of non-consenting creditors will be
treated. How can the plan proponent not exercise discretion when
determining whom and how to impair?

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

In re Windsor. 7 F.3d at 132.
Id.
See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 1, at 312.
I1 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (1988).
See. e.g., In re Gilbert. 104 B.R. 206, 216 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989).
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Similarly, how does one ascertain whether the impairment does not
"arise solely from the debtor's exercise of discretion"? For example,
perhaps the unsecured class treatment in Windsor was the result of
negotiation between the debtor and the unsecured class. Specifically,
perhaps Windsor originally proposed to pay the $13,000 unsecured
claims 100 days, not sixty days, after the effective date, and after lengthy
negotiations, the unsecured creditors and the debtor agreed to 'a
sixty-day payout period. If indeed the unsecured class treatment was the
result of negotiation between the debtor and the unsecured claimants,
would the unsecured class impairment not "arise solely from the debtor's
exercise of discretion"? Would the burden of proof on such an issue be
borne by the plan objector, or by the plan proponent? Similarly,
perhaps the unsecured creditors in Windsor realized they would receive
nothing if the Chapter 11 plan was denied confirmation and instead the
debtor would be liquidated in state court foreclosure proceedings. Given
this realization, perhaps the unsecured creditors and Windsor negotiated
and eventually agreed on the sixty-day plan treatment. Would such an
agreement mean the impairment of the unsecured class did not arise
"solely from the debtor's exercise of discretion"? Does not such
negotiation indicate creditor support, consistent with the legislative
policy of section 1124? Does not the affirmative vote of the unsecured
creditors reflect creditor participation, consistent with the legislative
policy of section 1124?
One wonders what result would have obtained if the unsecured class
would not have received payment within sixty days of the effective date,
but instead sixty-one days? Or sixty-two days? Or sixty-two years? The
Eighth Circuit panel surmised that Windsor could have paid the
unsecured claimants on the effective date and not on the sixtieth day
after the effective date. Surely "a dollar in hand today is worth more
than a dollar to be received a day, a month or a year hence." 6 5 To justify
the court's holding, one must conclude that sixty days "hence" is not a
material delay. Delay by degree, however, can only lead one back to
measuring whether creditors are "materially or adversely affected" by the
plan. The Bankruptcy Code specifically abandoned the "materially and
adversely affected" approach of the Bankruptcy Act. 66 The Eighth
Circuit's analysis is therefore contrary to express congressional intent.

65. In re Doud, 74 B.R. 865, 867 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987), affd 869 F.2d 1144 (8th Cir. 1989)
(quoting 5 CotUas ON BANKRUPrCY 11129.03, at 1129-62 (15th ed. 1986)).
66. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

To be sure, the fact that "question[s] of degree . . . require
subjective analysis by the bankruptcy court does not mean we should
throw in the towel." 67 Indeed, the Bankruptcy Code "already contains
numerous provisions which require subjective decisions by bankruptcy
judges." 6 8 But these "numerous provisions" that require "subjective
decisions" specifically vest the bankruptcy courts with the power and
duty to make the subjective calls. For example, the bankruptcy court
determines what constitutes "reasonable" compensation under section
330(a) of Title 11 of the United States Code. 6 9 The court also
determines the extent of "reasonable" reliance under section 523(a)(2)
(B) of Title 11 of the United States Code. Only "reasonable" fees may
be allowed as part of an oversecured claim by operation of section
506(b) of Title 11 of the United States Code. Chapter 11 plans may be
confirmed only if they are proposed in "good faith." 7 0 The bankruptcy
court may "cram down" a plan only if the plan is "fair and equitable." 7 1
A Chapter 9 municipality petition may be dismissed if the debtor
exhibited "unreasonable delay." 7 2 Unlike these and other Code
provisions, however, nothing in the impairment definition of section
1124 submits to any "subjective analysis." Indeed, unlike the "material
and adversely affected" impairment concept under the old Bankruptcy
Act, 7 3 the three "narrow exceptions" in section 1124 are capable of only
objective, not subjective, interpretation.
Windsor was a single-asset real estate partnership. Perhaps single
asset debtors such as Windsor do not belong in the Chapter 11 arena. 74
Instead, such debtors perhaps should be liquidated under Chapter 7 or
through state law foreclosures. To the extent one agrees with such a
proposition, the Windsor result-dismissal and denial of confir

67. Meltzer, supra note 1. at 320.
68. Id.
69. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (1988).
70. 11 U.S.C. §1129(a)(3) (1988).
71. 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(1) (1988).
72. 11 U.S.C. §930(a)(2) (1988).
73. 11 U.S.C. §507 (1976) (Bankruptcy Act § 179. repealed 1978); see supra notes 19-23 and
accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Cohn. Single-Asset Cases in Chapter 11, 26 TULSA L.J. 523 (1991); Molinaro.
Single-Asset Real Estate Bankruptcies: Curbing an Abuse of the Bankruptcy Process. 24 UCC LJ. 161
(1991).
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mation-may very well be correct. 7 5 Even if single-asset real estate
partnership debtors should be denied Chapter 11 relief, however, that
end should not justify the means. The availability of Chapter I1 relief to
single-asset real estate partnership debtors is a congressional decision,
not a judicial one. 76 To judicially interpret Code provisions with an eye
toward a particular result, laudable or otherwise, is not the preferred
method of policy-making. 7 7 To find impairment artificial and
arbitrary, 78 creative, 7 9 intentional,80 manufactured, 8 1 or transparent82
because the impairment "arises solely from the debtor's exercise of
discretion" is "not a rule of law. It is simply a license to make distinctions . . based on subjective considerations that will vary more widely
than the length of the chancellor's foot." 83 The Windsor analysis should
not be followed, and should instead be rejected.

75. But see Krause, The Bias of the CourtsAgainst Single-Asset Real Estate CasesIs CreatingBad
Law in the Area of Classification. 22 CAL. BANKR. J. 47, 56 (1994) (discussing the Eighth Circuit's
demonstration of "open hostility to single-asset cases" in Windsor).
76. Indeed. Congress has proposed legislation to address single asset real estate cases. See S.
4666, Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1993, § 202 reprinted in 140 CONG. REC. § 4666-4682
(providing that cases involving "single asset real estate" be subject to. inter alia, a shorter § 362
automatic stay than non-"single asset real estate" cases).
77. Cf.Krause, supra note 75, at 73 (stating that in the context of artificial classification-as
distinguished from artificial impairment-courts, "[biased on a general animosity toward single-asset
real estate cases and an unfounded concern that undersecured creditors do not have adequate
safeguards, . . . have imposed a misguided classification analysis which creates limitations that appear
nowhere in the Code[.]").
78. In re Windsor, 7 F.3d at 132.
79. See Meltzer, supra note 1, at 311 n.91 ("Plan proponents sometimes concoct various creative
theories for why the most seemingly meaningless impairment of a class is 'necessary' rather than
'artificial.'").
80. in re Greystone III Joint Venture, 102 B.R. 560, 570-71 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989), affd, 127
B.R. 138 (W.D. Tex. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 948 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1991), aiended on petition
for reh'g, 948 F.2d 134, 142 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 72 (1992).
81. In re Windsor, 7 F.3d at 130.
82. In re Lettick Typografic, Inc., 103 B.R. 32, 38 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989).
83. (In re Hanson), Hanson v. First Nat'l Bank in Brookings, 848 F.2d 866. 871 (Arnold, J..
concurring).

